

# Absolute grounds for refusal

## General principles

Once any deficiencies notified to the applicant under rule 12 have been overcome, the application is examined to see whether it satisfies the requirements for registration (rule 13(1)).

The Registrar must examine all applications to make sure that they comply with the provisions of the Ordinance (section 42(1)). If an application appears to meet these requirements, we have no power to refuse the application. However, we do have the right to withdraw our acceptance at any time, if details of the application have not yet been published, and if it appears that an application has been accepted in error (section 42(5)).

Where the application does not comply with the Ordinance, the Registrar must notify the applicant in writing to allow him to make representation or amend his application (section 42(3)).

Once the Registrar has notified the applicant why it appears to the Registrar that the requirements for registration are not met, it is for the applicant to satisfy the Registrar that the requirements are met (section 42(3) and (4)).

Section 42 is neutral and there is no presumption in favour for or against registration. The combined effect of section 42(4) and (5) is to eliminate the discretion that the Registrar previously had and to put him in a position of having to make a judgment, yes or no, upon the materials before him as to the registrability of a mark. There is nothing in the nature of a burden for the Registrar to discharge in order to justify his decision to refuse an application (*EUROLAMB* [1997] RPC 279).

Since section 11(8) specifies that :

“Where the grounds for refusal exist in respect of only some of the goods or services for which registration is sought, the refusal shall apply to those goods or services only.”,

the tests that follow must be applied to each item in the specification.

### **Section 11(1)(a) – not a “trade mark”**

As only “trade marks” can be registered under the Ordinance, our first step is to decide if the “sign” submitted for registration qualifies as a “trade mark”.

Since the sign’s capacity to be represented graphically will have been considered at the deficiency examination stage, the remaining question is to decide whether the sign is capable of distinguishing the goods or services of the applicant from those of others (“distinctive as to origin”).

The test to be applied has a very low threshold. The question could be expressed as – is this a sign which, hypothetically at least, could perform the function of identifying all goods marked with it as coming from the control of the same undertaking? If the answer to this question is yes, the “sign” is a trade mark and can be further considered for registration.

Under this test, signs that are most likely to be excluded under section 11(1)(a) would be single colours, the ordinary shapes of goods or their containers, the ordinary name for the goods or services such as “Soap” for soap, and highly descriptive or laudatory words or slogans such as “Purewool” or “where the best people eat”.

If we determine that the mark is not incapable of distinguishing the origin of a product, the next question we ask is – does it in fact do so on its face and without recourse to use or reputation? In other words, has it realised its potential to serve as an identifier of one

trader's goods or must the public first be educated that the mark is intended to be a trade mark?

This single test of distinctiveness applies throughout subsections (1)(b), (c) and (d).

Section 11 aims to stop the registration of any sign which does not perform its essential function as a trade mark, which is to distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking, without any possibility of confusion, from those of someone else. If the mark does the job, it doesn't matter if the mark is also slightly descriptive or laudatory. In JERYL LYNN Trade Mark [1999] FSR 491 at 497 Laddie J. said :

“The distinction between a sign which is capable of distinguishing for the purposes of trade mark law and one which is not can be turned into a question posed in colloquial language. Does the sign indicate who the product or service comes from or does it only tell the customer what the product or service is?”

If the trade mark does the job of distinguishing the origin of the goods or services being registered, without recourse to use, it passes the section 11(1) barrier and, if there is no conflict with an earlier trade mark, it may be accepted for registration.

If not, the applicant will need to establish that the mark has replaced normal perceptions with regard to the goods or services to be protected, and that it is now recognised by a reasonably observant, well-informed and cautious purchasing public as the trade mark of the applicant's undertaking, even if they are not aware of the company's name.

If the mark is not distinguishable by its appearance alone, the next step is determined by the trade mark itself. A useful question is – why does the mark fail to distinguish by its appearance? Has it failed to realise its hypothetical potential to distinguish as to origin because it consists *exclusively* of matter generic in the trade or *exclusively* of matter descriptive of the goods or services. If neither, does it still not distinguish the product or service in question without further evidence? The answer to this question will identify the correct subparagraph of section 11(1) for the objection. Of course the trade mark may have two or all three of these defects.

The *WELDMESH* mark shows how these tests apply. *WELDED MESH* is not capable of distinguishing and would fail section 11(1)(a). *WELDMESH* is capable but would not, without evidence of acquired distinctiveness, displace its primary meaning of mesh that is welded. It tells us what, but not who. *COOPER'S WELDED MESH* would be registrable without evidence.

In view of the considerable overlap between the provisions of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), they are not considered as interdependent or mutually exclusive. They can be considered both individually or cumulatively.

Although there is a single test for distinctiveness, there are matters peculiar to each subsection which must be considered before taking an objection under any of the paragraphs (b), (c) or (d).

### **Section 11(1)(b) – not distinctive**

The operative words in section 11(1)(b) are “distinctive character”. “Distinctive” has a technical meaning in trade mark law. It means to serve to guarantee that all goods bearing the mark come from the control of the same undertaking. A mark can be striking, unusual, memorable or different, which can contribute to it being distinctive, but if it does not provide that guarantee of origin, it is not distinctive in law.

“Devoid” simply means lacking.

The use of the word “any” could imply a low threshold but in practice this is misleading. If a mark cannot on its face displace the primary meaning of the words or graphic device used (without evidence of acquired distinctiveness) it has no distinctive character – or put in the statutory language – it is devoid of any distinctive character. Its character is something other than “distinctive”.

Objections taken under other paragraphs do not stop objections from also being taken under paragraph (b). FRESHBANKING is objectionable under paragraph (c) – FRESH (quality) BANKING (kind of service). The conjoining of FRESHBANKING does not, without evidence of acquired distinctiveness, change the primary meaning of the words, i.e. a new style of banking. It tells us what the service is and a characteristic of it but not whose service – so it is also devoid of any distinctive character. Another example is “For Him”.

It is doubtful whether the old test of “distinctiveness” (*W. & G. Du Cros Ltd's Appln* (1913) 30 RPC 660 at 672) has been carried over into the new law. The test is no longer whether other traders are likely, without improper motive, to desire to use the mark in connection with their own goods, but rather can the mark itself (any use aside) distinguish one trader’s goods from the goods of others. If so, it has a distinctive character.

### **Section 11(1)(c) – descriptive trade marks**

Section 11(1)(c) is applicable only when the sign consists *exclusively* of the descriptive material. If there is another element in the sign, which has a distinctive character, the sign can only be considered under section 11(1)(b).

The second point to note is that, whilst a “trade mark” may consist of personal names (section 3(2)) a mark comprising exclusively of a personal name is not among the prohibited signs in this subsection as it does not refer to a characteristic of the goods or services. See chapter on Registrability of surnames, personal names, signatures and images of individuals for more detailed guidance.

The third point to note is that the words “... which *may* serve, in trade or business, to designate ...” suggests that a mark which is reasonably likely to be used by honest traders to designate characteristics of their goods or services ought to be refused without it being necessary to show that the sign is actually used or needed by the trade in question.

The words “may serve to designate” allow for a degree of foreseeability (absent from section 11(1)(d)) that the mark may be perceived by the relevant class of persons as a new form of descriptive expression. There is no reason why the exclusion from registration contained in section 11(1)(c) should make no allowance for the advent of new forms of descriptive expressions, e.g. “broadband”, “e-cinema”.

The fifth point is that section 11(1)(c) makes no distinction between signs which would be absolutely descriptive regardless of the goods or services to which they are applied (i.e. quality, quantity, value, geographical origin (though to a lesser degree), time of production of goods or rendering of services) from those which are dependent on the goods or services concerned (i.e. kind, intended purpose or other characteristics). This is an important consideration as a sign suggestive of the intended purpose may not be suggestive of the intended purpose for every item in the specification. Section 11(8) provides that where the ground for refusal exists in respect of only some of the goods or services for which the application for registration is made, the refusal will apply to those goods only.

Although there is no express provision equivalent to section 12(2) of Cap. 43, any trade mark which is the commonly used and accepted name of any single chemical element or compound, will fall within the provisions of section 11(1)(c) if registration is sought for goods being a chemical substance or preparation.

The test is to determine whether the trade mark submitted for registration does the job of distinguishing as to origin or merely describes the purpose of or a characteristic of the goods or services. The sign need not be totally non-descriptive. Section 19(3)(c) would not be necessary if the Ordinance did not contemplate that the kinds of signs referred to therein could not be registered. On the other hand, a mark is not truly distinctive if it can be applied to another’s goods.

A useful question to ask is how would a reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant and reasonably cautious person view the sign? As an origin neutral reference to the goods or services on which it is to be applied, or as an identifier of origin? If the

former, an objection should be taken, if the latter, the sign performs the essential function of distinguishing as to origin.

## **Section 11(1)(d) – generic trade marks**

The first thing to note about section 11(1)(d) is that it only applies to trade marks which consist *exclusively* of the prohibited matter. If there is any other element in the mark with a distinctive quality, the trade mark should not be refused registration on this ground (composite marks could however conflict with the requirements under section 11(1)(b)).

A spanner device for car servicing, a chef's hat for restaurant services, a bunch of grapes for wine, stars for hotel services or brandy are examples of devices which are customary in the established practices of the trade concerned. However, five stars on a Martell brandy label would not fall within the provision because of the distinctive word Martell.

NETWORK, NET, WEB, CYBER, LINK, TELECOM are examples of words which have become customary in the current language of the trade.

The second point to note is that the tense used in the sub-section is the perfect tense – "... which *have* become ...". Also note the use of the word "current" in the phrase "... customary in the *current* language ...". This wording combines to exclude speculation on whether use of the mark may become customary in the *future*. The mark must have an *established* meaning.

Section 11(1)(d) does not restrict refusal to signs which are customary in the trade for the goods or services for which registration is sought. Words commonly used in advertising or as an inducement to purchase the product generally would not be allowed by the provision.

Examples would be MACHO, BREAKTHROUGH, PASSION, ENVY, AROUSE, REVOLUTIONARY, SERIOUS. Such signs do not relate to a characteristic of the goods or services (that falls under section 11(1)(c)), rather they relate to a perceived benefit from owning the goods or using the service.

Keep in mind however that some signs would only be in customary use in a particular field. NETWORK would be totally unregistrable for computer software but should raise no objections for clothing.

The mere fact that the sign would be covered by section 11(1)(d) does not mean that an objection should necessarily be raised. The sole test is to determine if the sign does the job of distinguishing as to origin.

## **Section 11(2) – acquired distinctiveness**

Trade marks refused registration under sections 11(1)(b) (devoid of any distinctive character); 11(1)(c) (trade marks which are descriptive) or 11(1)(d) (trade marks which are generic) may nevertheless be accepted if the applicant establishes, to the satisfaction of the Registrar, that, **before the date of the application for registration**, the trade mark has in fact acquired a distinctive character as a result of the use made of it. The distinctiveness acquired by the use of the mark must exist before the date of the application to register. No consideration will be given to any likelihood that the mark will become distinctive, due to any advertising or promotion by the mark's owners.

Section 11(2) does not extend to signs precluded from registration by section 11(1)(a), i.e. those incapable of distinguishing as to origin. There must accordingly be a hypothetical capacity to distinguish before objections can be raised under section 11(1)(b), (c) or (d) and which may be overcome by use. Section 11(2) also does not extend to signs which are refused under section 11(3), nor to trade marks refused under sections 11(4), 11(5), 11(6) or 11(7).



The purpose of the evidence is to demonstrate that, despite the objectionable nature of the trade mark, it had in fact, prior to the application for registration, become identified, in the minds of the public, with a particular trader's goods or services. That is what is meant by "distinctive character".

"Premier" applied to luggage would be objectionable under section 11(1)(c) (solely designating quality) and 11(1)(b) (devoid of any distinctive character) but on evidence from the trade, may be shown to identify the luggage manufactured by a particular manufacturer.

Some trade marks may not, on their face, appear to designate origin at all. Examples of these are container shapes ("Yakult" bottle); slogans ("the real thing"); or laudatory words ("Treat"). Evidence filed to overcome objection to these marks must be directed at showing that the public, upon seeing or hearing such marks, identify them with the products of a particular undertaking. Evidence showing how the undertaking has endeavoured to educate the public that the sign is as much an indication of origin as the brand name (respectively "Yakult"; "Coca Cola"; and "Silver Spoon") would be highly relevant.

Proof of extensive use or extensive promotion alone may not satisfy the requirement of establishing "distinctive character" on a highly descriptive or common place mark. Additional evidence of public or trade recognition will be required.

Evidence should answer the following questions in the affirmative :

- Has the trade mark been used as a trade mark?
- Has the applicant promoted the trade mark as a trade mark?
- Does the evidence show, as a matter of fact, that the trade mark is operating in the market place as an indicator of origin?
- Has the primary meaning of the trade mark been displaced that, in relation to the goods or services, it has come to denote those of the applicant?

- Does the evidence overall show that the trade mark does in fact, distinguish the applicant's goods or services?

If the evidence that would be required to establish the factual distinctiveness of a descriptive or common place trade mark would need to come from a market survey or trade evidence, consideration should be given to obtaining that evidence **before** applying for registration. Any market survey evidence obtained after objection is raised must satisfy the requirement that the trade mark was so recognised as an indicator of origin **before** the application date.

The following categories of marks, likely to have been refused registration under section 11(1)(b), (c) or (d), can be considered with evidence of acquired distinctiveness :

- Common surnames and personal names
- Letters and numerals
- Descriptive words
- Misspellings of descriptive words
- Geographical place names
- Descriptive foreign words
- Descriptive devices (not common to the trade)

- 3D shapes representing the shape of the goods, or packaging or containers for the goods
  
- Colour combinations
  
  
- Sound and smells

Whether the mark has acquired a distinctive character depends on degree. The onus rests on the applicant to prove the case. Extensive use alone may not be sufficient. “TREAT” for example, was not saved by evidence of its substantial sales.

Evidence of the amounts spent on advertising the mark may not be conclusive. Some of the most memorable television advertisements, for example, are remembered for their entertainment values leaving no recollection of the advertiser.

There is no fixed period of use, although five years is a useful benchmark. Extensive use over a shorter period may well be sufficient, although use for less than two years prior to the date of application would very unlikely be regarded as sufficient. Use should be continuous, though strong sales after a break may well establish that the distinctiveness acquired before the break has not been lost.

An application for a different typeface to that actually used needs to be considered carefully. Would the variant qualify as a series? If not, the use would not qualify as establishing factual distinctiveness.

The use must also relate to the goods or services sought to be protected. If it only supports some categories, the applicant must seek an amendment to delete those goods or services where the mark has not been shown to be factually distinctive. Some flexibility is possible if the evidence shows use for a range of goods within a general term, e.g. stationery.

Prior registration of a variant of the trade mark sought to be registered (which would not qualify as a series) or a prior registration of the trade mark in respect of different goods or services will not assist.

Established use must be by the applicant or if not, the link to the applicant, a distributor for example, must be explained.

In assessing the acquired distinctive character of a mark the following can be taken into account :

- the market share held by the mark;
- the intensiveness, geographical reach and long-standing use of the mark;
- the amount invested by the owner in promoting the mark, the number of people who, because of the mark, identify the goods as originating from the particular owner; and
- statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations.

We also consider the spill-over effects from overseas promotions. We will also take account of the inherent characteristics of the mark, including whether it does or does not contain an element descriptive of the relevant goods or services. The more descriptive the mark, the more likely it is to be equally applied to the goods of others.

The use must be in respect of the mark applied for, although it may be used together with background or decorative elements or with another distinctive mark.

Where the mark is used together with another trade mark, we also need to consider whether it would be recognised as a trade mark on its own, i.e. as a secondary trade mark. The following can be taken into account:

- the strength of the objection to the mark
- any evidence of use of the mark on its own even if it is normally used as part of, or in conjunction with, the other trade mark?
- is the other trade mark so highly distinctive that it is likely to overwhelm the mark?
- has the mark been used distinctively to educate the public that it is a trade mark, albeit in combination with a house mark or another established mark of the same proprietor? (e.g. is the trade mark highlighted or emphasized in some way)?

If the mark is always seen with another distinctive sign it is doubtful that the mark will be distinctive when presented on its own, e.g. “TREAT” was always accompanied by the established mark “SILVER SPOON”<sup>1</sup>; or “POUR N’ WHIP” was always used in conjunction with the distinctive signs “AVOSET” and “Sims”<sup>2</sup>. For this reason, where a mark is used alongside another distinctive sign, the burden on the applicant to show that it has come to be seen as a secondary trade mark will be greater.<sup>3</sup>

The assessment of distinctive character must also refer to the particular goods or services to be protected and examined from the point of view of an informed, reasonably observant and reasonably cautious purchaser of the goods. The average customer normally sees a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details. Such a customer’s level of attention is also likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question. Finally, where the application for registration contains no limitations as to how the sign is to be used, we should pay attention to the various marketing methods and practices that the average user of the relevant goods or services is likely to meet under normal and fair trading conditions.

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<sup>1</sup> British Sugar v Robertson case

<sup>2</sup> Hong Kong Trade Marks Registry Decision, 31 May 2007

<sup>3</sup> HAVE A BREAK (ECJ) Case 353/03 and British Sugar v Robertson case, [1997] E.T.M.R. 118

If, on the basis of these factors, we conclude that the relevant class of persons, or at least a significant proportion of them, identify the goods as originating from a particular undertaking because of the trade mark, we will rule that the requirement for registering the mark as laid down in section 11(2) has been satisfied.

The concept of “extension of equity” is not carried over to the new law. Section 11(2) refers to an acquired distinctive character as a result of the use made of “it”, i.e. the mark applied for. A degree of latitude is permissible if the use proved is of a mark that would be regarded as “a series” mark i.e. use of the mark in capitals when the applied for mark is in lower case. However, where the use proved is of a variant which would not qualify as “a series”, the fact that the variant is registered is irrelevant. Similarly neither use of “a series” mark nor the registration of a variant mark in respect of different goods will establish acquired distinctiveness.

Applicants may uplift and re-file or adopt evidence filed for the earlier mark to assist in proving acquired distinctiveness. The mode of giving evidence in all trade mark proceedings before the Registrar is governed by rule 79, which states that it be by way of a statutory declaration or affidavit. Rule 80 governs how such documents are to be made and signed.

The proforma shown at the end of this chapter is for the assistance of those applicants with no or little knowledge of the formalities of a statutory declaration or affidavit. The clauses provided would be common to most statutory declarations or affidavits filed under section 11(2). They will need to be expanded with further evidence peculiar to the application in question. Filing evidence comprising **only** the clauses provided is no guarantee that the mark will be accepted on acquired distinctiveness.

If the mark is accepted on evidence of use, the publication of particulars of the application in the Hong Kong Intellectual Property Journal under section 43 will include the words ‘This trade mark has been accepted because of distinctiveness acquired through use.’.

If the mark is accepted on evidence of use, which includes trade or survey evidence, the

publication of particulars of the application in the Hong Kong Intellectual Property Journal under section 43 will include the words “This trade mark has been accepted because of distinctiveness acquired through use and trade (or survey) evidence.”.

Where an applied-for mark is identical to, or would be considered “a series” of, a trade mark registered in the name of the applicant which was accepted on the basis of acquired distinctive character through use, the Registrar may take that fact into account in considering an absolute grounds objection. In determining whether an objection should be raised the Registrar will also consider whether the applied-for goods/services are identical to those of the registered trade mark.

If an application is accepted because the applied-for mark is identical to or would be considered “a series” of the registered trade mark which was itself accepted on the basis of acquired distinctive character through use, the following endorsement will be placed on the register: “Proceeding because of Trade Mark No. #”.

**Section 11(3)** – see chapter on Shape marks

### **Section 11(4)(a) – marks contrary to accepted principles of morality**

Section 11(4)(a) differs from the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK) in that it omits “contrary to public policy”. As with all the subsections of section 11, the Registrar’s decision rests on the exercise of judgment, not the exercise of discretion – see *Ghazilian’s Trade Mark Appln (“TINY PENIS”)* [2001] RPC 654.

Each case must be decided on its own facts. The dividing line will be drawn between offence which amounts only to distaste, against offence which would justifiably cause outrage, or would be the subject of justifiable censure as being likely to significantly undermine current religious, family or social values. The outrage or censure must be within an identifiable section of the public, and a higher degree of outrage or censure amongst a small section of the community will be sufficient just as lesser outrage or censure amongst a more widespread section of the public will also suffice.

Our approach would be to invoke the concept of right-thinking members of the public. A right-thinking member may personally not be outraged, but will be able to objectively assess whether or not the mark in question is calculated to cause “outrage” or “censure” amongst a relevant section of the public. The matter must be approached objectively. It does not matter whether the examiner finds the mark personally unacceptable. Section 11(4)(a) is also not concerned with political correctness, rather it is concerned with principles of morality.

### **Section 11(4)(b) – marks that are likely to deceive**

Section 11(4)(b), unlike section 12(1) of Cap. 43, is not concerned with likely deception as the result of an earlier unregistered mark or passing-off. Remedies for this type of deception are covered under section 12(5)(a) which can only be raised in opposition proceedings.

The potential for deception can be removed by the applicant’s acceptance of a limitation. Despite rule 10 of the Trade Marks Rules, which provides that any limitation must be included in the application, rule 23(b) allows the amendment of an application by adding a limitation. Another removal method of any potential for deception can be the amendment of the application to restrict the goods or services covered by the application under section 46(3)(a).

The types of deception that could lead to an objection under this subsection are not defined. Clearly they would include marks which give rise to an expectation which will not be fulfilled (given the content of the specification). If by the words or graphic device used the mark suggest its manufacture in an area that is famous for the quality of the specified goods, and the goods are made elsewhere, objections will be raised. The composition of the goods, if the materials used make a significant contribution to the purchase decision, suggestions of patronage, or approvals, suggestions of environmental friendliness, provided that this quality is relevant to the goods or services concerned, are other examples.



The use of the words “likely to deceive” means that there must be a real rather than an imagined possibility of deception occurring. The use of the words “the public” means that particular consideration must be given to the nature of the trade and its customers. “Youth Glow” for cosmetics for example, would not lead to any real expectations that its use by elderly customers would restore a youthful skin tone. However if a mark appears to be the name of a university, and yet the institution does not award any recognised qualification, it may be deceptive, since a “university” is an institution of higher education having authority to award bachelors’ and higher degrees (Collins English Dictionary).

Special consideration should be applied in relation to applications for trademarks for tobacco products under Class 34. Marks may be refused on the grounds that they are false, misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression about the product’s characteristics, health effects, hazards or emissions, including any term, descriptor, figurative or any other sign that directly or indirectly creates the false impression that a particular tobacco product is less harmful than other tobacco products. These may include terms such as “low tar”, “light”, “ultra-light”, or “mild”.

## **Section 11(5)(a) – use prohibited in Hong Kong by virtue of any law**

As with section 11(4)(b) this subsection is not intended to cover passing-off or conflict with an earlier right under registered designs or copyright as section 12(5) specifically protects these rights. If use of the proposed trade mark would amount to an offence under the Trade Descriptions Ordinance the section will be invoked.

“Any law” extends the scope beyond statutory law though no aspect of the common law readily comes to mind which would be affected by this prohibition.

## **Section 11(5)(b) – bad faith**

The Ordinance no longer contains specific grounds for opposition based on proprietorship. Any claim to ownership of an earlier mark or earlier right is covered by section 12. However the protection given by section 12 to earlier rights is limited to situations where the use of the later mark would be prevented by the law of passing-off. This may not be an adequate remedy in every case. Accordingly, applying for a mark knowing it is someone else's could amount to bad faith. In examining applications for registration, we may need to conduct Internet searches to gauge whether a trademark is distinctive for registration. If the Internet search results indicate that the applicant is attempting to register a trade mark that is someone else's, we may query whether the application has been made in bad faith and ask the applicant to provide written endorsement of the owner of the trade mark in question.

Circumstances where an objection based on section 11(5)(b) would be justified include the following:

- *Pre-emption* – if the applicant knows of a mark used overseas and knows that the owner of the mark intends to trade in Hong Kong. The applicant need not have a fiduciary relationship with the owner though this would be a factor pointing to bad faith – see DAAWAT Trade Mark [2002] RPC 297.

- *No intention to use* – The bad faith involved here is in certifying an honest intention to use the mark on the application form (as required by section 38(3)) when that statement is false – see *DEMON ALE Trade Mark* [2000] RPC 345. If the applicant has no proprietary interest in the service for which the mark is registered, the application may, for the same reason, be considered as bad faith – *MICKEY DEES (Nightclub) Trade Mark* [1998] RPC 359.
- If the mark incorporates the name or image of a well-known person without his agreement.

### **Section 11(6) – national and regional flags and emblems**

This subsection prohibits the registration of signs consisting of or containing the national and regional flags and emblems.

This section must be read with the National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance Cap. 2401 and the Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance Cap. 2602.

### **Section 11(7)**

This subsection prohibits the registration of the national emblems of WTO members or international organisations.

This must be read together with sections 64 and 65.

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## SAMPLE FORMAT OF A STATUTORY DECLARATION

IN THE MATTER OF the Trade Marks  
Ordinance (Cap. 559)

Trade mark application no. [#]  
in the name of [*the applicant*]  
for the registration of [*trade mark*]  
in Class(es) [#] in Hong Kong

AND

IN THE MATTER OF the Oaths and  
Declarations Ordinance (Cap. 11)

### STATUTORY DECLARATION

I, [*declarant*] of [*address*], solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. I am [*capacity or position*] of [*the applicant*] of [*address*], the applicant herein.
2. I have been associated with the applicant for [#] years and have occupied my present position since [*year*].
3. I have free access to the records of the applicant relating to its trade marks and the user thereof. The facts set forth in this declaration are within my personal knowledge or are derived from the records of the applicant and I am duly authorised by the applicant to make this declaration on its behalf.
4. The applicant first used the trade mark [*trade mark*] in Hong Kong in [*month & year*]. [*State whether it has since been used by the applicant continuously in Hong Kong.*]

5. The goods/services on which the trade mark has been used in Hong Kong, and the date of first use, are as follows:

Class [#]: [description of goods/services] first used in the year [year]

Class [#]: [description of goods/services] first used in the year [year]

6. There is now produced and shown to me marked “Exhibit ###” [description].

[exhibits of samples, catalogues and other printed materials demonstrating use of the mark exactly as applied for in relation to each of the classes of goods and services applied for]

7. Sales of the goods/services by the applicant in Hong Kong within 5 years before the date of application were as follows:

Class [#]

19... \$...

19... \$...

20... \$...

20... \$...

20... \$...

Class [#]

19... \$...

19... \$...

20... \$...

20... \$...

20... \$...

8. There is now produced and shown to me marked “Exhibit ###” [description].  
[exhibits of invoices]

9. Amounts spent on promoting the goods/services in Hong Kong within 5 years before the date of application were as follows:

19.. \$...  
19.. \$...  
20.. \$...  
20.. \$...  
20.. \$...

Promotion of the goods/services was conducted by means of advertisements in [description of media]. [Any other means of promotion]

10. There is now produced and shown to me marked "Exhibit ###" [description]. [exhibits of sample advertisements illustrating the way in which the mark is used to promote the goods/services]

11. [Any other relevant information]

And I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance.

[Signature and name of declarant]

Declared at [...] this [...] day of [...]

Before me,

[Signature and designation, i.e. Justice of the Peace/Notary Public/Commissioner for Oaths]

## EXAMPLE OF A COMPLETED STATUTORY DECLARATION

IN THE MATTER OF the Trade Marks  
Ordinance (Cap. 559)

Trade mark application no. 987654321  
in the name of ABC LIMITED  
for the registration of “FASMOW”  
in Classes 7 and 8 in Hong Kong

AND

IN THE MATTER OF the Oaths and  
Declarations Ordinance (Cap. 11)

### STATUTORY DECLARATION

I, Thomas Mow of 5<sup>th</sup> Floor, 99 Duddell Street, Central, Hong Kong, solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:

1. I am the Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of ABC LIMITED of 5<sup>th</sup> Floor, 99 Duddell Street, Central, Hong Kong, the applicant herein.
2. I have been associated with the applicant for 20 years and have occupied my present position since 1996.
3. I have free access to the records of the applicant relating to its trade marks and the user thereof. The facts set forth in this declaration are within my personal knowledge or are derived from the records of the applicant and I am duly authorised by the applicant to make this declaration on its behalf.
4. The trade mark “FASMOW” (the “Trade Mark”) was first devised by the applicant independently in April 1995, by combining the letters “FAS” with the

letters "MOW". Those letters were derived from the names of the Product Design Manager of the applicant, Mr. F. A. So and myself, who were the designers of a new line of lawnmowers developed in 1995 by the applicant. There is now produced and shown to me marked "Exhibit A" an extract of an Employer's Return filed by the applicant in 1996 which included the names of Mr, So and myself.

The Trade Mark was devised honestly by the applicant without knowledge of the cited earlier mark no. 403922333.

5. The applicant first used the Trade Mark in Hong Kong in July 1995. It has since been used by the applicant continuously in Hong Kong.

6. The goods on which the Trade Mark has been used in Hong Kong, and the date of first use, are as follows:-

Class 7:       Lawnmowers and parts and fittings for lawnmowers.  
                  First used in the year 1995

Class 8:       Hand tools and implements (hand operated) for cutting grass  
                  First used in the year 1996.

7. There is now produced and shown to me marked "Exhibit B" catalogues dated 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 showing lawnmowers bearing the Trade Mark.

8. There is now produced and shown to me marked "Exhibit C" catalogues dated 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 showing hand operated tools for cutting grass bearing the Trade Mark.

9. Sales of the goods by the applicant in Hong Kong under the trade mark within 5 years before the date of application were as follows:



	Class 7 goods (HK\$)	Class 8 goods (HK\$)
1998	\$7,467,200	\$1,825,600
1999	\$9,355,400	\$1,701,570
2000	\$12,305,600	\$2,350,850
2001	\$11,467,200	\$2,762,300
2002	\$13,255,700	\$3,854,250

10. There is now produced and shown to me marked “Exhibit D” copies of invoices in relation to sales of lawnmowers under the Trade Mark from 1998 to 2002.

11. There is now produced and shown to me marked “Exhibit E” copies of invoices in relation to sales of hand operated tools for cutting grass under the Trade Mark from 1998 to 2002.

12. Amounts spent on promoting the goods in Hong Kong within 5 years before the date of application were as follows:

1998	\$515,600
1999	\$521,870
2000	\$801,420
2001	\$1,100,250
2002	\$1,501,300

Promotion of the goods was conducted by means of advertisements in magazines (“Lawnmowers Monthly” and “Hong Kong Gardening News”), television advertisements on DTV, and distributing printed materials to retailers and potential customers.

13. There is now produced and shown to me marked “Exhibit F” copies of advertisements for the Class 7 goods which appeared in the “Lawnmowers

Monthly” and “Hong Kong Gardening News” in June 1998, June 1999, August 2000, July 2001 and August 2002.

14. There is now produced and shown to me marked “Exhibit G” copies of advertisements for the Class 8 goods which appeared in the “Lawnmowers Monthly” and “Hong Kong Gardening News” in August 1998, July 1999, August 2000, September 2001 and August 2002.
  
15. I truly believe that as a result of the use made of the trade mark by the applicant, the trade mark “FASMOW” is well known to the general public and to buyers and users in Hong Kong of lawnmowers and hand operated tools for cutting grass, that it is uniquely associated with ABC Limited, and that it distinguishes the lawnmowers and hand operated tools for cutting grass sold by ABC Limited from those of others.

And I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance.

(Signed) THOMAS MOW

Declared at Central, Hong Kong this 30<sup>th</sup> day of April 2003

Before me,

(Signed) WONG MEI MEI LILY

Solicitor of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

**EXAMPLE OF A COMPLETED EXHIBIT SHEET TO ACCOMPANY  
A STATUTORY DECLARATION**

IN THE MATTER OF the Trade Marks  
Ordinance (Cap. 559)  
Trade mark application no. 987654321  
in the name of ABC LIMITED  
for the registration of “FASMOW”  
in Classes 7 and 8 in Hong Kong

AND

IN THE MATTER OF the Oaths and  
Declarations Ordinance (Cap. 11)

This is the exhibit marked “Exhibit A” referred to in the Statutory Declaration of  
Thomas Mow dated this 30<sup>th</sup> day of April 2003.

Before me,

(Signed) WONG MEI MEI LILY

Solicitor of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region